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Acquisitions are generally assumed to be objective, or focused on the numbers.  Consistent with 
this perspective, synergy is the most common justification for acquisition activity.  Achieving 
synergy involves integrating firms to produce a combined performance greater than what they 
achieved independently.  An implicit challenge then is to coordinate the efforts of groups with 
different interests to realize expected gains.  This means that acquisitions quickly go from 
numbers to considering the impacts on people, as achieving synergy requires clear 
communication of the implications of an acquisition to impacted groups.  As a result, considering 
and enlisting stakeholders becomes important to achieve success for any acquisition.   
Accomplishing a stakeholder analysis during acquisition planning can identify and address issues 
by helping to communicate information to influential groups.  Still, gaps between different 
stakeholder groups are often not addressed in acquisitions, or they are considered too late.
1
  The 
starting point for any stakeholder analysis is identifying different groups and their interests.  The 
perspective of seven stakeholder groups is briefly reviewed as a guide to improving acquisition 
outcomes. 
1. Employees.  The first group to consider relates to the impacted employees, as even the 
best strategy will fail if it does not consider the people needed to execute it.  When 
employees learn of a merger, they expect and are prepared for dramatic changes.  
Employees will be hungry for information to cope with the uncertainty created by an 
acquisition.  Employees will look to see that a plan for creating a better organization 
exists and for signals that people matter, as well as answers to what the acquisition means 
for them.
2
  This means employees will have little tolerance for delays that fail to set a 
clear direction that communicates their place in a merged firm.  An example of 
something that can help reduce employee anxiety in large companies is an e-mail from 
the CEO to employees about a merger, so they learn about it from work and not the 
press.
3
 In smaller firms, a face to face meeting would be a better option to share news and 
implications of an acquisition.  Without these steps, a lack of information to employees 
will only lead to speculation and resulting anxiety that will complicate integration efforts.   
Employee commitment to a merged firm is lowest following an acquisition 
announcement and increased employee turnover is a primary suspect in poor acquisition 
performance.  An obvious reason for this is that the first employees to leave are generally 
the best and brightest.  In other words, if an acquirer does not take steps to address the 
concerns of their employees they will likely find what they bought walked out the door 
when they were not looking.  For example, many employees will get job offers from 
competitors within five days of an acquisition announcement.
4
  Successful acquirers 
focus on retaining employees, if for no other reason than to avoid the need to recruit old 
employees back at a higher salary.  However, if the employees are not “on board” with 
the business and communication plan, competitors have a greater ability to frame the 
discussion with the market.   
2. Competitors.  While obvious in hindsight, it is easy to overlook this group.  Failing to 
consider the actions of groups that want to see you fail can hurt your success, and 
competitive pressures driving the use of an acquisition to meet firm goals do not end once 
an acquisition is announced.  Acquisition announcements are public and clarify what 
competitors can expect.  Often competitors treat the inevitable distraction of combining 
firms as an opportunity.  Not bound by restrictions of regulatory review competitors can 
immediately plant doubts with customers and employees.  For example, quality 
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disruptions frequently occur during acquisitions from downsizing manufacturing capacity 
and transferring work to facilities with people unfamiliar with the products and processes 
used to produce them.   Meanwhile, employees will also have lower commitment to a 
new organization.
5
  As a result, competitors also actively recruit from the employees and 
customers of firms involved in a merger when those firms are most vulnerable.   
3. Customers. Merging firms often focus on internal issues during integration at the expense 
of external market issues, and customers of both acquirer and target firms are sometimes 
overlooked.
6
  For example, service disruptions during an acquisition results in two-thirds 
of merged businesses losing market share.
7
  Again, failing to address customer impacts in 
a communication plan will provide competitors an opportunity to frame customer 
perceptions on the impact of a merger.   
A strong emphasis on communicating with customers can reduce uncertainty and lower 
customer defection, as retaining customers may be more important to acquisition 
performance than reducing costs.  In one example, while a combination of two high-
technology companies was meant to better serve IBM, uncertainty about implications of 
the merger led IBM to cut its orders for the firms in half because no one communicated 
what the acquisition meant to this important customer.
8
  Firms that communicate a 
continued commitment to their customers by considering their perspective during a 
merger can expect improved success.   
4. Advisors.  Completing an acquisition depends on advisors and incorporating an external 
perspective can enable better acquisition decisions.  Additionally, more prestigious 
advisors can provide important reputation advantages.  However, increasing the number 
of advisors increases the amount of time and money to complete a deal.
9
  This becomes 
an important consideration as the primary advantage of acquisitions involves speed or 
faster access to needed resources than internal development.  Another consideration for 
public firms and sellers is that advisors may be required to help ensure managers fulfill 
their fiduciary obligations to shareholders.  For example, as part of due diligence 
following an announcement to purchase Titan Corp for $2.4 billion, Lockheed Martin 
uncovered improper overseas payments that led to a Justice Department investigation and 
cancellation of the deal.
10
  It is unlikely irregularities, such as this one, could be found 
without the help of external auditors.  Having a team of seasoned advisors can help find 
and account for negative information that can effect a deal’s value. 
5. Lenders.  Most acquirers include debt as part of their payment for a target, making 
lenders an important advisor.  While lenders are interested in available collateral and the 
use of provided funds, they will also be interested in the projections of the merged firm 
and its ability to pay off the increased debt load. Selection of lenders is an important 
consideration, as more prestigious underwriters are associated with positive outcomes, 
such as completing deals faster.
11
   Banks may also be interested in marketing other 
services—a circumstance that can complicate their interests.  For example, Barclays 
Capital recently agreed to pay Del Monte shareholders almost $90 million following 
conflict of interest surrounding allegations it steered the sale of Del Monte to bidders 
using it for financing.
12
  The desire for advisory fees may bias bank lending decisions, so 
prudence may drive keeping deal advisors and lenders separate.   
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6. Vendors.  Acquisitions can also be disruptive to businesses a merged firm depends on.  
Suppliers of goods and services of merging companies will have a vested interest in their 
ability to continue to supply a business and in being paid on a timely basis.  It is not 
uncommon for vendors to require updated credit data for merging firms.  Still, an 
acquisition offers the opportunity to consolidate vendors and increase bargaining power.  
As a result, vendors will want information about continued business. 
Communication with vendors, especially the key ones, is another critical piece of the 
overall acquisition communication plan.  The last thing an acquiring company wants to 
learn is that a key vendor is skittish about the transaction and that they may not deliver 
scheduled product or service!  In other words, without vendor support a merged firm can 
find it difficult to maintain normal operations. 
7. Government Regulators.  Firms planning an acquisition generally make filings with 
government agencies for regulatory approval that is followed by a waiting period that 
allows regulators to review information to consider labor or anticompetitive implications, 
and any conditions for completing a deal.  For example, plant closings often require 
advance notice under state and federal law before it can be accomplished.  Requirements 
for regulatory review go beyond the state and nation where firms are headquartered.  For 
example, the European Union required concessions from Intel prior to providing 
regulatory approval of its McAfee acquisition.
13
  Only focusing on U.S. requirements 
likely hurt approval of the NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Borse merger, as Duncan 
Niederauer (CEO of NYSE Euronext) commented that he “misjudged the process” and 
that it was unlikely the merger would happen. 
While the focus for regulators is satisfying requirements, a more proactive approach goes 
from anticipating regulatory review to influencing it.  However, going beyond providing 
information to regulators is a higher risk strategy.  For example, AT&T employed a team 
of 93 lobbyists in Washington D.C. and spent $46 million in campaign contributions to 
both parties in a failed effort to get its bid for T-Mobile approved.
14
   This suggests that 
an obvious way to strengthen regulatory resistance is to announce a deal as a fait 
accompli before or during regulatory review.  The risk of a deal failing regulatory 
approval has to be considered and dealt with along with at the start of in the negotiation 
process. 
Summary 
Strategic decisions need to go beyond the numbers to consider the stakeholders, or any group 
that is affected by a firm’s initiatives.  Once identified, planning to balance the interests of 
different groups can begin.  Going “beyond the numbers” to consider the perspectives of 
different groups can provide a better appreciation of acquisition challenges and enable improved 
outcomes. The groups outlined here represent important groups, or a place to start, for any firm 
considering an acquisition. 
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